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INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND EXECUTIVE
POWER—INTERPRETING AND IMPLEMENTING
INTERNATIONAL TREATY OBLIGATIONS
Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008)

I.

FACTS

In 1994, Jose Ernando Medellín, a Mexican national, was convicted of
capital murder and sentenced to death in a Texas state court for the gang
rapes and murders of two Houston teenagers.1 The rapes and subsequent
murders took place on June 24, 1993.2 Medellín was arrested five days
later, on June 29, at approximately 4:30 a.m.3 Following the arrest, local
law enforcement officers gave Medellín Miranda warnings, but failed to
advise him of his Vienna Convention right to seek assistance from the
Mexican consul and to notify the Mexican consulate of his detention.4 A
few hours later, Medellín gave a detailed written confession.5 Medellín was
convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death.6
In 1997, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction
and sentence.7 Medellín subsequently filed a state application for postconviction relief with the state trial court, arguing his conviction and sentence should be vacated as a remedy for the violation of his Vienna Convention rights.8 The trial court denied relief, finding the claim concerning
Medellín’s Vienna Convention rights to be procedurally defaulted, as Medellín did not raise the claim at trial or on direct appeal.9 The trial court
1. Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1354 (2008).
2. Id. At the time of the crime, Medellín was a member of the “Black and Whites” gang. Id.
To prevent the victims from identifying the gang members who took part in the rapes, Medellín
personally murdered at least one of the girls by strangling her with her own shoelace. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. Although Medellín had lived in the United States most of his life, he was still a national of Mexico. Id.; see also Brief for Petitioner at 6-7, Medellín v. Texas, No. 06-984 (June 28,
2007) (stating that Medellín told the arresting officers he was born in Mexico and informed the
Harris County Pretrial Services he was not a citizen of the United States).
5. Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1354.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.; see also Christopher N. Lasch, The Future of Teague Retroactivity, or “Redressability,” After Danforth v. Minnesota: Why Courts Should Give Retroactive Effect on New Constitutional Procedure in Postconviction Proceedings, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 63 (2009) (explaining
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also rejected the claim on the merits, holding Medellín failed to show actual
prejudice arising from the alleged Vienna Convention violation.10 The
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed.11 In 2001, Medellín filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Texas.12 The district court denied the petition stating
Medellín’s Vienna Convention claim was procedurally defaulted.13 The district court further held Medellín had failed to show that any alleged violation of his Vienna Convention rights impacted the validity of his conviction
and sentence.14 Medellín appealed.15
In 2003, Mexico initiated proceedings against the United States before
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on behalf of fifty-one Mexican nationals, including Medellín.16 The International Court of Justice issued its
decision in Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals17 while
Medellín’s application for a certification of appealability was still pending
in the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.18 The ICJ held that by failing to inform the fifty-one Mexican nationals of their Vienna Convention rights, the
United States violated Article 36(1)(b) of the Vienna Convention.19 Accordingly, the ICJ held that the United States was obligated to provide, by
means of its own choosing, review and reconsideration of the convictions
that the procedural default rule prohibits a party from raising claims in post conviction
proceedings that “could or should have been raised on direct review”).
10. Id. at 1354-55.
11. Id. at 1355.
12. Id. (citing Medellín v. Cockrell, Civ. Action No. H-01-4078 (S.D. Tex. June 26, 2003)).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1352-53. The ICJ is the primary judicial organ of the United Nations. Id. at 1353.
Established in 1945, the ICJ serves as the international tribunal for adjudication of disputes between member states. Id. at 1352, 1353. The United States and Mexico are both parties to the
Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes to the Vienna Convention.
Id. at 1353. The Optional Protocol states, in relevant part, that “disputes arising out of the interpretation or application of the Vienna Convention . . . ‘lie within the compulsory jurisdiction of
the ICJ.’” Id. It further provides that any party of a dispute, which is also a party to the Optional
Protocol, may properly bring a claim before the ICJ. Id. At the time Mexico initiated proceedings
before the ICJ, both parties submitted themselves to the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ with
respect to any disputes arising from the application and interpretation of the Vienna Convention.
Id.
17. Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12
(Mar. 31).
18. Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1355.
19. Id. Article 36(1)(b) of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations states that a detained foreign national must be informed of his right to consular notification and, if requested by
him, the authorities of the receiving state (here, the United States) must, without delay, inform the
consulate of the sending state that a national of that state has been arrested or detained in any
manner. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, art. 36(1)(b), Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77,
T.I.A.S. No. 6820 (ratified by the United States on Nov. 24, 1969) [hereinafter Vienna
Convention].
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and sentences of the affected Mexican nationals, regardless of Texas’ state
procedural default rules.20 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, however,
denied a certificate of appealability, holding that the Vienna Convention did
not confer individually enforceable rights, and Vienna Convention claims
were subject to state procedural default rules.21 Following the Fifth Circuit’s decision, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.22
In 2005, before the Supreme Court could hear oral arguments, President George W. Bush issued a Memorandum to the United States Attorney
General.23 The President declared that the United States would discharge
its international obligations under Avena, by having state courts provide the
required review and reconsideration to the fifty-one Mexican nationals
named in Avena.24 Relying on the President’s Memorandum, Medellín
filed a second petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals.25 The United States Supreme Court subsequently dismissed Medellín’s petition for certiorari as improvidently granted.26 The
Court dismissed the petition for certiorari because the state court proceedings might have provided Medellín with the review and reconsideration ordered by the ICJ.27 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed Medellín’s second state habeas application as abuse of writ, holding that
neither the President’s Memorandum, nor the ICJ decision, could remove
the state procedural bar on Medellín’s application for relief.28 The United
States Supreme Court again granted certiorari.29
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution provides, “all
Treaties . . . which shall be made . . . under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State
20. Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1355 (citing Avena, 2004 I.C.J. at 72).
21. Id. (citing Medellín v. Dretke, 371 F.3d 270, 279-80 (5th Cir. 2004)).
22. Id. (citing Medellín v. Dretke (Medellín I), 544 U.S. 660, 661 (2005) (per curiam)).
23. Id.
24. Id. The full text of the President’s Memorandum reads as follows:
I have determined, pursuant to the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, that the United States will discharge
its international obligations under the decision of the International Court of Justice in
[Avena], by having State courts give effect to the decision in accordance with general
principles of comity in cases filed by the 51 Mexican nationals addressed in that
decision.
Id.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 1356 (citing Ex parte Medellín, 223 S.W.3d 315, 322-23 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Ex parte Medellín, 223 S.W.3d at 352).
Id.
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shall be bound thereby.”30 The complex decision of Medellín v. Texas31 implicates numerous relevant treaties. First, the applicable sections of the
Vienna Convention, the Optional Protocol, and the United Nations Charter
are examined. Then, the distinction between self-executing and non-selfexecuting treaties is explained.32 The role of the Executive in the
implementation of international treaties is analyzed next. Finally, a discussion of proceedings before the International Court of Justice, including the
Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals, and the United
States Supreme Court’s response to Avena, is provided.
A. THE RELEVANT TREATIES: INTERPRETATION
AND IMPLEMENTATION
The first section introduces treaties relevant to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Medellín v. Texas, which include the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations, the Optional Protocol to the Vienna
Convention, and the United Nations Charter. An examination of what
makes international treaties self-executing or non-self-executing is then
provided. The examination of the principle of self-execution is followed by
an analysis of the Executive’s role in the implementation of these treaties.
1.

The Relevant Treaties: The Vienna Convention, the Optional
Protocol, and the United Nations Charter

The Vienna Convention was drafted in 1963 to promote open relations
among nations.33 In 1969, upon the advice and consent of the Senate, the
United States ratified the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.34 Article 36 of the Convention on Consular Relations facilitates consular functions among the member states.35 The Article contains two provisions,
particularly relevant to the understanding of Medellín’s claim for the violation of his Vienna Convention rights.36 First, Article 36(1)(b) requires the
signatory nations to the Convention to inform arrested foreign nationals of
their right to request assistance from their nation’s consulate.37 Second, Ar30. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
31. 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008).
32. See generally Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy
Clause and the Judicial Enforcement of Treaties, 122 HARV. L. REV. 599, 604-06 (2008) (discussing the difference between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties and the United
States Supreme Court’s precedent relevant to making that distinction).
33. Vienna Convention, supra note 19, preamble, at 77, 79.
34. Id. preamble, at 77.
35. Id. art. 36, at 100-01.
36. Id.
37. Id. art. 36(1)(b), at 101.
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ticle 36(2) requires that the rights referenced in subsection one be exercised
in conformity with the laws and regulations of the arresting State, provided
these laws and regulations give full effect to the purposes for which the
rights are intended.38
At the time the Supreme Court heard Medellín, the United States was
also a party to the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention.39 Article I
of the Optional Protocol compels member states to submit all disputes arising out of the interpretation and application of the Vienna Convention to the
compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice.40 The Article
further provides that any party to a dispute may bring the dispute before the
ICJ, given that the party is also a party to the present Protocol.41 By ratifying the Optional Protocol, the United States agreed to submit itself to the
specific jurisdiction of the ICJ with respect to any claims arising under the
Vienna Convention.42
The third and final treaty relevant to the Supreme Court’s decision in
Medellín, the United Nations Charter (U.N. Charter), provides that each
member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of
the ICJ in any case to which it is a party.43 In addition, annexed to the U.N.
Charter is the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ Statute).44
The ICJ Statute sets the organizational structure of the Court and provides
the governing procedures for cases brought before the ICJ.45 Furthermore,
the ICJ Statute states that an ICJ judgment is final and has binding force as
to the parties of a particular case.46 Once the relevant treaties have been

38. Id. art. 36(2), at 101.
39. Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 24, 1963, 21
U.S.T. 325, 369 T.I.A.S. No. 6820 [hereinafter Optional Protocol].
40. Id. art. I, at 326.
41. Id.
42. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 339 (2006). On March 7, 2005, following the
ICJ decision in Avena, the United States withdrew from the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention. Id. (citing Letter from Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State, to Kofi A. Annan, SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations (Mar. 7, 2005)).
43. Charter of the United Nations art. 94(1), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1051, available at
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/index.shtml [hereinafter U.N. Charter].
44. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 1, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, available
at http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4&p2=2&p3=o [hereinafter ICJ Statute].
45. Id. art. 59-60, at 1062-63.
46. Id. According to the ICJ Statute, a State may consent to ICJ jurisdiction in one of two
ways: (1) the State may consent to the ICJ’s general jurisdiction, including jurisdiction over any
dispute arising out of a general international treaty or law; or (2) it may consent to specific jurisdiction over a particular category of disputes. Id. In 1985, the United States withdrew from the
general jurisdiction of the ICJ. Id. (citing U.S. Dept. of State Letter and Statement Concerning
Termination of Acceptance of ICJ Compulsory Jurisdiction (Oct. 7, 1985)). As previously mentioned, in 2005, the United States also withdrew from the specific jurisdiction of the ICJ with respect to disputes arising out of the interpretation and application of the Vienna Convention.
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identified, the next step for courts is to inquire whether the treaty is selfexecuting, that is, judicially enforceable.47
2.

Self-Executing and Non-Self-Executing Treaties

The United States Supreme Court, in Foster v. Neilson,48 introduced
for the first time the concept of self-execution.49 The distinction between
self-executing and non-self-executing treaties is examined through the
framework established in Foster.50 In Foster v. Neilson, the Supreme Court
examined an 1819 treaty between the United States and Spain.51 The relevant treaty provision stated that grants of land made by Spain shall be ratified and confirmed to the grantee.52 The Court held that the treaty was nonself-executing because the language “shall be ratified” demonstrated that
the treaty contemplated further legislative action.53 Non-self-executing
treaties, the Court stated, required action by the political—not the judicial—
branch and could be enforced only by implementing legislation.54 On the
contrary, the Court explained that a self-executing treaty operated of itself,
without legislative aid.55 A self-executing treaty was thus equivalent to an
act of the legislature and was automatically binding on the courts of the
United States.56 The distinction between self-executing and non-selfexecuting treaties established in Foster continued to be the governing principle for Supreme Court decisions, although the distinction proved difficult
to apply.57
In Igartua-De La Rosa v. United States,58 residents of Puerto Rico
brought suit against the United States, alleging their inability to vote in

Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 339 (citing Letter from Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State, to Kofi
A. Annan, Secretary-General of the United Nations (Mar. 7, 2005)).
47. See Vázquez, supra note 32, at 628 (discussing the concept of self-execution and the
exception of non-self-execution).
48. 27 U.S. 253 (1829), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S.
51 (1833).
49. Foster, 27 U.S. at 314.
50. See discussion infra Part II.A.2 (explaining the difference between the principles of selfexecution and non-self-execution).
51. Foster, 27 U.S. at 310.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 315.
54. Id.; see also Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) (holding that a non-selfexecuting treaty could be carried into effect only through an act of the legislature).
55. Foster, 27 U.S. at 314.
56. Id. at 315; see also Whitney, 124 U.S. at 194 (stating that only self-executing treaties
have the same legal effect as an act by the legislature).
57. See Vázquez, supra note 32, at 633 (explaining that nations do not concern themselves
with questions of domestic implementation when negotiating international treaties).
58. 417 F.3d. 145 (1st Cir. 2005) (en banc).
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presidential elections ran contrary to certain international treaty obligations
assumed by the United States.59 The First Circuit Court of Appeals
acknowledged the numerous treaties signed by the United States over the
years and recognized the treaties comprised international commitments.60
The Court, however, held that the treaties could become domestic law only
if they were self-executing or if Congress enacted implementing statutes.61
Thus, in rejecting the petitioners’ claim, the First Circuit Court of Appeals
reaffirmed the long-standing principle that international treaties are not
binding domestic law unless they are self-executed or legislatively implemented.62 The First Circuit further held that a federal court could not find
the United States in violation of its treaty obligations where the President
negotiated a non-self-executing treaty and Congress had refused to adopt
implementing legislation.63 To hold otherwise, the First Circuit stated,
would be an attempt to undermine the constitutional allocations of power
and would constitute an attempt by a federal court to do what both the
President and Congress have expressly declined to do—give the treaty domestically binding legal effect.64 The First Circuit failed to address, however, the power of the Executive to bind domestic courts in the absence of
implementing legislation by Congress.65
3.

The Authority of the Executive in Implementing
International Treaties

Supreme Court decisions provide limited guidance on the President’s
“Article II treaty-implementation authority [] to circumvent ordinary legislative process and preempt state law.”66 However, as with any other
governmental power, the President’s authority to act with respect to international treaty obligations arises from either an act of Congress or from the
Constitution itself.67 Justice Jackson’s concurrence in Youngstown Sheet &
59. Igartua-De La Rosa, 417 F.3d at 146-47.
60. Id. at 150.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See discussion infra Part II.A.3; see also Ernest A. Young, Supranational Rulings as
Judgments and Precedents, 18 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 477, 514-15 (2008) (discussing the
President’s power to execute treaties).
66. Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1390 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing the lack of precedent
concerning the authority of the Executive to preempt contrary state law pursuant to a ratified
treaty); see also Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. Of California, 512 U.S. 298, 329 (1994)
(refusing to consider “the scope of the President’s power to preempt state law pursuant to authority delegated by a statute or a ratified treaty”); but see United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 230-31
(1942) (stating that state law must yield if inconsistent with provisions of international treaties).
67. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952).
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Tube Co. v. Sawyer68 provides the framework for evaluating executive action in this area.69
In Youngstown, Justice Jackson explained that the President’s ability to
act could be placed in one of three broad categories.70 In the first category,
where the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of
Congress, the President’s authority is at its maximum, for it includes all of
his or her Article II powers plus all the powers that Congress can delegate
to the Executive.71 In the second category, where the President acts in the
absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority, the President
has all of his or her Article II powers plus any powers that fall in the “twilight zone,” or, the powers that overlap with those of Congress.72 Finally,
where the President acts in contravention of the will of Congress, the Executive’s power is at its minimum, as the President can only rely on the exclusive Article II powers—those that belong to the President and the President
only.73 Thus, the authority of the Executive to implement treaties and give
binding domestic effect to the judgments of the ICJ depends on whether the
President acts pursuant to, in the absence of, or contrary to the will of Congress.74 In the past decade, the ICJ has heard and ruled on the implementation of United States’ treaty obligations in proceedings concerning nationals
of Paraguay, Germany, and Mexico.75
B. PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
Proceedings against the United States for Article 36 violations under
the Vienna Convention have been brought before the ICJ on three separate
occasions—first, by Paraguay in 1998, then by Germany in 1999, and finally, by Mexico in 2003.76 In each case, the authorities of the United
68. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
69. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 637.
73. Id.
74. See generally discussion infra Part II.A.3 (examining the Youngstown framework in the
context of the President’s treaty-implementation authority).
75. See discussion infra Part II.B (discussing proceedings against the United States brought
before the International Court of Justice).
76. See generally Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 248
(Provisional Measures Order of Apr. 9) (holding the United States in violation of Article 36(1)(b)
of the Vienna Convention by failing to inform the arrested foreign national of his right to consular
notification under the Convention); see also LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27)
(stating the United States had an obligation under the Vienna Convention to inform the detained
foreign nationals of their right to consular notification); Avena, 2004 I.C.J at 17 (explaining the
United States violated the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations by failing to inform the
Mexican Consulate of Medellín’s arrest and detention).
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States arrested a national of the respective foreign State and subsequently
convicted and sentenced that foreign national to death.77 After a series of
unsuccessful appeals in each case, the affected foreign state brought suit on
behalf of its nationals before the ICJ.78 In all three cases, the ICJ found that
the United States had breached its obligation under the Vienna Convention
by failing to inform the arrested foreign nationals of their Convention-given
right to consular notification.79 Moreover, in LaGrand80 and Avena, the ICJ
held that to remedy the Article 36 violations, the United States was obligated to review and reconsider the convictions and sentences of the affected
foreign nationals, notwithstanding procedural default rules.81
1.

Paraguay Initiates Proceedings Against the United States
Before the ICJ

In 1993, a Virginia state court convicted Angel Francisco Breard, a Paraguayan national, of murder and sentenced him to death.82 Following his
conviction and sentence, Breard filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in
a federal district court, raising for the first time his Vienna Convention
claim.83 The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia denied the petition as procedurally defaulted because Breard failed to
raise the claim at trial or on direct appeal.84 The execution date was set for
April 14, 1998.85 On April 3, 1998, Paraguay initiated proceedings against
the United States alleging Breard was not informed of his Vienna Convention right to contact the Paraguayan consular office in violation of Article
36(1) of the Convention.86 In addition, Paraguay argued that the United
77. See, e.g., LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. at 475 (discussing the arrest of two German nationals in
relation to a first-degree murder and attempted armed robbery and their subsequent convictions
and death sentences).
78. See, e.g., Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 1998 I.C.J. at 249 (stating that Paraguay instituted proceedings with the ICJ following Breard’s unsuccessful appeals in the United
States’ courts).
79. See, e.g., LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. at 515.
80. (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27).
81. See, e.g., Avena, 2004 I.C.J. at 65-66 (holding that review and reconsideration of the foreign nationals’ convictions and sentences should not be barred by state procedural default rules);
see also LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. at 516 (stating that while the United States can review the convictions and sentences by means of its own choosing, the review shall not be affected by procedural
default rules).
82. Breard v. Commonwealth, 445 S.E.2d 670, 673, 682 (Va. 1994) (affirming the Circuit
Court for Arlington County in finding Breard guilty of rape and capital murder and sentencing
him to death).
83. Breard v. Netherland, 949 F. Supp. 1255, 1260 (E.D. Va. 1996).
84. Id. at 1263.
85. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 248, 249 (Provisional Measures Order of Apr. 9).
86. Id. at 248-49.
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States, as the detaining State, failed to advise the Paraguayan consular officers of Breard’s detention, thus preventing the Paraguayan officials from
rendering assistance.87
Drawing on the Court’s power to order provisional measures, the ICJ
unanimously held that the United States shall take all necessary measures to
ensure that Breard would not be executed pending final decision of the ICJ
proceedings.88 Breard subsequently filed a petition for original writ of habeas corpus with the United States Supreme Court, asking the court to enforce the ICJ order.89 The Supreme Court, by a vote of six to three, denied
the petition.90 The Court stated that while the ICJ’s interpretation of
international treaties deserved due consideration, absent an express indication to the contrary, the procedural rules of the forum State must govern the
treaty’s implementation in that State.91 The Court held that the language of
Article 36(2) of the Vienna Convention clearly allowed a signatory State to
exercise the rights expressed in the Convention in conformity with its own
laws and regulations, provided such laws and regulations gave full effect to
the purposes for which the rights were intended.92 The Court concluded
that denial of Breard’s petition was proper because Breard’s failure to raise
the Vienna Convention claim in state court first rendered the claim procedurally defaulted, in violation of the laws of the United States and the Commonwealth of Virginia.93 The ICJ expanded on its holding in Breard a year
later when Germany initiated proceedings against the United States, alleging the United States had violated its obligations under the Vienna
Convention.94
2.

Germany Initiates Proceedings Against the United States
Before the ICJ

On January 7, 1982, Arizona law enforcement officers arrested Karl
and Walter LaGrand, German nationals, for their alleged involvement in an
attempted armed bank robbery in Marana, Arizona.95 The law enforcement
officers suspected that Karl and Walter LaGrand murdered the bank manger
and seriously injured another bank employee during the course of the al87. Id. at 249.
88. Id. at 258.
89. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 374 (1998) (per curiam).
90. Id. at 378-81.
91. Id. at 375.
92. Id. (citing Vienna Convention, supra note 19, art. 36(2), at 101).
93. Id. at 375-76.
94. See discussion infra Part II.B.2 (discussing the proceedings initiated by Germany against
the United States before the ICJ).
95. LaGrand, (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 475 (June 27).
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leged robbery.96 In 1984, the Superior Court of Pima County, Arizona,
convicted both Karl and Walter LaGrand of murder in the first degree and
sentenced each to death.97 After a series of unsuccessful appeals, the LaGrands filed applications for writs of habeas corpus in the United States
District Court for the District of Arizona, for the first time asserting violations of their Vienna Convention rights.98 The district court dismissed the
claim as procedurally defaulted, given the Petitioners’ failure to raise the
claim at trial or on direct appeal.99 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment and in 1999, the United States Supreme Court denied
further review.100 The execution of Karl LaGrand took place on February
24, 1999.101
On March 2, 1999, the day before the scheduled date of execution for
Walter LaGrand, Germany initiated proceedings before the ICJ.102 Germany alleged that in arresting, detaining, and failing to inform Karl and
Walter LaGrand of their Article 36 rights, the United States violated the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and deprived Germany of providing consular assistance to its detained nationals.103 On March 3, 1999,
the ICJ issued an order indicating provisional measures and requested that
the United States ensure the stay of execution of Walter LaGrand pending
final decision of the ICJ.104 On the same day, Germany initiated proceedings in the United States Supreme Court, seeking compliance with the ICJ
order of provisional measures.105 The Supreme Court refused to exercise its
original jurisdiction in the action brought by Germany against the United
States and dismissed the case.106 In relation to these proceedings, the

96. Id.
97. State v. LaGrand, 734 P.2d 563, 565 (Ariz. 1987). In addition to the conviction of murder in the first degree, the Superior Court of Pima, Arizona, convicted the defendants of attempted
murder in the first degree, attempted armed robbery, and two counts of kidnapping. Id. The Superior Court sentenced the LaGrands to death for the first-degree murder and to concurrent sentences of imprisonment for the other charges. Id.
98. LaGrand v. Stewart, 133 F.3d 1253, 1261-63 (9th Cir. 1998).
99. Id. at 1259.
100. LaGrand v. Stewart, 170 F.3d 1158, 1161 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1061
(1999).
101. LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. at 478.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 473-74.
104. Id. at 479.
105. Federal Republic of Germany v. United States, 526 U.S. 111, 111-12 (1999) (per
curiam).
106. Id. at 112. The Court stated that Germany did not have the right, under the Vienna Convention, to assert a claim against the State of Arizona for imposing a death sentence upon a German national. Id. The Court viewed such an assertion as contrary to the principles of the Eleventh
Amendment, which addresses a state’s ability to be sued. Id. Moreover, because Arizona imposed
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United States Solicitor General, as council of record, took the position that
the ICJ order was not binding and did not provide a basis for judicial relief.107 The State of Arizona executed Walter LaGrand on March 3, 1999,
the same day the United States Supreme Court dismissed Germany’s motion for stay of execution.108
Although both Karl and Walter LaGrand were executed, Germany did
not withdraw its case from the ICJ.109 In reviewing the merits of Germany’s case, the ICJ, by a fourteen-to-one vote, held that the United States
breached its obligations to Germany, by failing to inform Karl and Walter
LaGrand of their rights under Article 36(1)(b) of the Vienna Convention
and thereby depriving Germany from rendering timely consular assistance
to its detained nationals.110 The ICJ found that Article 36(1)(b) of the
Vienna Convention conferred upon foreign nationals individual rights,
which could be invoked on their behalf by their nation in proceedings before the ICJ.111 Furthermore, the ICJ asserted that the United States
breached its obligation under the Convention by failing to comply with the
ICJ order on provisional measures because such an order bound the United
States.112 The ICJ concluded that, in the future, should German nationals be
detained, convicted, and sentenced to severe penalties irrespective of their
rights under Article 36(1)(b), the United States would be obligated to provide, by means of its own choosing, review and reconsideration of the convictions and sentences.113 In doing so, the United States must take into account the possible prejudice caused by such violations.114 Moreover, the
ICJ held that the review and reconsideration should not be barred by state
procedural default rules, as such a bar would offend the purposes for which
the rights were intended and would necessarily constitute a violation of Article 36(2) of the Vienna Convention.115 The ICJ reached the same conclusion in Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals.116

the sentence in 1984 and Germany learned about it in 1992, the claim was tardy, thus preventing
the Court from exercising jurisdiction. Id.
107. LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J at 479; see also Federal Republic of Germany v. United States,
526 U.S. at 113 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting the letter by the Solicitor General for the United
States, in which the Solicitor General admitted he did not have the “time to read the materials thoroughly or to digest the contents” of the order issued by the ICJ).
108. LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. at 479-80.
109. Id. at 480.
110. Id. at 515.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 516.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See discussion infra Part II.B.3 (analyzing the ICJ decision in Avena).
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Mexico Initiates Proceedings Against the United States
Before the ICJ

On January 9, 2003, Mexico instituted proceedings before the ICJ
against the United States, alleging violations of Article 36 of the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations with respect to fifty-two Mexican nationals, including Medellín.117 Mexico argued that in fifty of the fifty-two
cases, authorities in the United States failed to inform the Mexican nationals of their right to consular notification under Article 36(1)(b) of the
Vienna Convention.118 On February 5, 2003, the ICJ issued a provisional
measures order regarding three of the named Mexican nationals, who at that
time had exhausted all judicial remedies in the United States and were facing executions in the upcoming months or even weeks.119 The ICJ ordered
the United States to take all actions available at its disposal to ensure these
individuals would not be executed pending final judgment of the ICJ.120
The ICJ rendered its decision on the merits of Mexico’s claim on
March 31, 2004.121 It held, by a fourteen-to-one vote, that by failing to inform the fifty-one detained Mexican nationals of their rights under Article
36(1)(b) of the Vienna Convention, the United States breached its obligations under the Convention.122 The United States further breached its
obligations under the Vienna Convention by failing to notify the Mexican
consular post of the detention of forty-eight of the fifty-one named Mexican
nationals and thus depriving Mexico of the opportunity to provide consular
assistance to these individuals.123 According to the ICJ, the appropriate
reparation would be for the United States to provide, by means of its own
choosing, review and reconsideration of the convictions and sentences of
the named Mexican nationals.124 In doing so, however, the United States
117. Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12,
17, 54 (Mar. 31). At the time Mexico filed its application with the ICJ, all fifty-two individuals
were on death row. Id. at 27. In addition, of the fifty-two cases involved in the proceedings
brought by Mexico before the ICJ, forty-nine were at different stages in state or federal courts in
the United States. Id.
118. Id. at 26. In the remaining two cases, Mexico asserted the detained individuals were
informed of their Vienna Convention rights but not without delay, as required by the Convention.
Id.
119. Id. at 27. The three individuals were Mr. Fierro, Mr. Moreno, and Mr. Torres. Id. At
the time of judgment, none of them had been executed, although an execution date of May 18,
2004 was set for Mr. Torres by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals. Id. at 28.
120. Id. at 17.
121. Id. at 12.
122. Id. at 71. The number of Mexican nationals was reduced because in the case of Mr.
Salcido (case No. 22), the ICJ found that Mexico failed to prove that the United States’ authorities
were aware Mr. Salcido was a foreign national. Id. at 46.
123. Id. at 54.
124. Id. at 72.
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was obligated to take into account the violations of the rights expressed in
the Vienna Convention and more specifically, the legal consequences of
such violations on the individual criminal proceedings.125 Lastly, as in LaGrand, the ICJ concluded that the process of review and reconsideration
was best suited for the judicial process and should therefore occur within
the judicial proceedings concerning the individual defendants.126 State
procedural default rules should not bar the process of review.127 The United
States Supreme Court first responded to the ICJ judgments in LaGrand and
Avena in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon,128 issued after the ICJ rendered its
decision in Avena, but involving individuals not named in Avena.129
C. U.S. SUPREME COURT RESPONSE: ARTICLE 36 CLAIMS ARE
SUBJECT TO PROCEDURAL DEFAULT RULES
In Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, the United States Supreme Court confronted the question of whether a defendant’s failure to raise an Article 36
claim at trial or on direct appeal rendered the claim procedurally defaulted
in a post conviction proceeding.130 Answering this question in the affirmative, the Supreme Court held that post-conviction arguments asserting violations of the Vienna Convention were subject to the same state procedural
default rules as any other federal law claim.131 The case involved Mario
Bustillo, a Honduran national, whose jury conviction of first-degree murder
resulted in a thirty-year prison sentence.132 Following the conviction, Bustillo filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in state court where, for the
first time, he raised the violation of his Vienna Convention right to consular
notification.133 The court dismissed the claim as procedurally barred because Bustillo had failed to raise it at trial or on direct appeal.134 The Vir-

125. Id. at 62.
126. Id. at 65-66 (citing LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 516 (June 27)).
127. Id.
128. 548 U.S. 331 (2006).
129. See discussion infra Part II.C (analyzing the response of the United States Supreme
Court to the ICJ judgment in Avena, which found that claims arising out of violations of the
Vienna Convention are not subject to state procedural default rules).
130. Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 337. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the
Court, in which Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito joined. Id. Justice Ginsburg filed an
opinion concurring in the judgment. Id. at 360. Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which
Justices Stevens and Souter joined, and in which Justice Ginsburg joined as to Part II. Id. at 365.
131. Id. at 356.
132. Id. at 341.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 342.
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ginia Supreme Court found no reversible error, and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on the Vienna Convention issue.135
Relying on the ICJ decisions in LaGrand and Avena, Bustillo urged the
Court to interpret the Vienna Convention as precluding the application of
procedural default rules to his claim, arguing such application would prevent the United States from giving full effect to the purposes for which the
rights were intended.136 The Court, in rejecting Bustillo’s argument, held
that while ICJ interpretations of international treaties should be given due
consideration, such interpretations are not binding on the courts of the
United States.137 ICJ judgments, the Court noted, are binding only on the
parties involved in a particular case.138 Furthermore, the Court pointed out
that ICJ judgments were not to be awarded significant weight because, following Avena, the United States withdrew from the Optional Protocol and
ceased to recognize ICJ jurisdiction in disputes arising out of the Vienna
Convention.139 The Court concluded LaGrand and Avena did not control
the outcome of Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon.140
In addition, the Court found that the language of Article 36 allowed
procedural default rules to apply to Vienna Convention claims.141 The
Court thus rejected the ICJ conclusion in LaGrand and Avena that application of procedural rules failed to give full effect to the purposes for which
the rights were intended.142 The Court stated that the ICJ failed to distinguish between the importance of procedural default rules in an adversarial
system, such as the United States legal system, and an inquisitorial legal
system, common in the majority of Vienna Convention signatory nations.143
135. Id.
136. Id. at 352-53 (citing LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 497 (June 27) and Case
Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12, 66 (Mar. 31)).
137. Id. at 354.
138. Id. The Court interpreted Article 59 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice
to mean that ICJ judgments did not bind other courts, including the ICJ itself, because any
decision rendered by the ICJ had “no binding force except between the parties and in respect of
that particular case.” Id. at 354-55 (quoting ICJ Statute at art. 59, 1062).
139. Id. at 355.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 356.
142. Id. Article 36(2) provides that the right expressed in Article 36(1) “shall be exercised in
conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving State, subject to the proviso, however,
that the said laws and regulations must enable full effect to be given to the purposes for which the
rights accorded under this article are intended.” Vienna Convention, supra note 19, art. 36(2), at
101.
143. Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 356-57. The Court noted that an adversary system relies
primarily on the parties to raise important issues before the courts and that procedural default
rules are designed to encourage parties to do so at the proper time for adjudication. Id. (emphasis
in original). On the contrary, in a magistrate-directed, inquisitorial legal system, the responsibility
to raise a legal issue does not rest primarily with the parties themselves, and failure to raise a legal
error can therefore be partly attributed to the magistrate or the state itself. Id. at 357. Thus, be-
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Given the lack of express or implied language in the Vienna Convention to
the contrary, the Court held that claims under Article 36 of the Convention
were subject to state procedural default rules.144
Writing for the minority, Justice Breyer stated that pursuant to the ICJ
decisions in LaGrand and Avena, the Vienna Convention obligated member
States to inform detained foreign nationals of the right to contact their nation’s consulate and seek assistance.145 The dissent did not construe the ICJ
judgments as requiring American courts to ignore procedural default
rules.146 Instead, the dissent noted that all that was required of a state court
with regard to Article 36 violations was to excuse a procedural default rule
where the defendant’s failure to bring the claim sooner was the result of the
underlying violation or where the State was unwilling to provide some other
effective remedy.147
The decision in Sanchez-Llamas reaffirmed the Court’s position that
treaty implementation is subject to the procedural default rules of the forum
state, absent a clear and express statement to the contrary.148 Moreover, the
Court held that ICJ judgments are not controlling on the courts of the
United States and are binding only as to the parties of a particular case.149
Thus, while LaGrand and Avena were entitled to respectful consideration,
the Court in Sanchez-Llamas refused to require states to hear Vienna Convention claims, notwithstanding state procedural default rules.150 In Medellín v. Texas, the United States Supreme Court expanded on the issue of
implementation of ICJ judgments by examining not only the power of the
Court, but also the power of the Executive to preempt state procedural default rules and give binding domestic legal effect to the decisions of the
ICJ.151
III. ANALYSIS
In Medellín, Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court,
in which Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito joined.152 The
cause parties to a dispute in an adversary system have the primary responsibility of raising their
claims promptly, the ICJ interpretation of Article 36 is inconsistent with the basic characteristics
of an adversary system. Id.
144. Id. at 360.
145. Id. at 370 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 387.
147. Id. at 388.
148. Id. at 351 (citing Breard v. Green, 523 U.S. 371, 375 (1998)).
149. Id. at 354.
150. Id. at 360.
151. See discussion infra Part III.A (analyzing the majority opinion in Medellín v. Texas).
152. Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1352 (2008).
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majority held that neither the ICJ judgment in Avena nor the President’s
Memorandum constituted directly enforceable federal law that preempted
state procedural default rules.153 Justice Stevens concurred with the judgment.154 Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Souter
and Ginsburg joined.155
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
The Court granted certiorari in Medellín v. Texas to decide two questions.156 First, the Court addressed whether the ICJ judgment in Avena was
directly enforceable as domestic law in a state court in the United States.157
Second, the Court examined whether the President’s Memorandum could
bind state courts in the United States to give effect to the ICJ judgment in
Avena, without regard to state procedural default rules.158 In Avena, the ICJ
found the United States violated the rights of fifty-one named Mexican nationals, including Medellín, to consular notification under the Vienna Convention.159 The ICJ further held that the United States was obligated to provide, by means of its own choosing, review and reconsideration of the
sentences and convictions of the named Mexican nationals, notwithstanding
state procedural default rules.160 The majority found that while the Avena
judgment created an international obligation on the part of the United
States, in the absence of implementing legislation, the Avena judgment did
not constitute binding federal law that preempted state procedural default
rules.161 The Court further held that the President did not have the authority
to unilaterally execute an international judgment by giving it binding domestic effect.162
1.

The ICJ Judgment in Avena is Not Automatically Binding
Domestic Law

Medellín argued that the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution rendered Avena a binding obligation on state and federal courts in the United

153. Id. at 1353.
154. Id. at 1372 (Stevens, J., concurring).
155. Id. at 1375 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
156. Id. at 1353.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1352 (citing Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v.
U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12, 71 (Mar. 31)).
160. Id. (citing Avena, 2004 I.C.J. at 72).
161. Id. at 1367.
162. Id. at 1369.
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States.163 Medellín asserted that the treaties requiring compliance with
Avena were already the “law of the land,” and therefore the ICJ judgment
was binding federal law that preempted state procedural default rules.164 In
rejecting Medellín’s argument, the Court distinguished between treaties that
have automatic domestic legal effect and treaties that might constitute an
international obligation on the part of the United States, but cannot by
themselves become binding federal law.165 A treaty with automatic effect
as domestic law is a self-executing treaty, operating of itself and not requiring further legislative action.166 In contrast, the Court found that nonself-executing treaties could become binding federal law only through an
act of Congress.167 Thus, the Court concluded that while some treaties
might impose an international obligation on the part of the United States,
international treaties can become domestic law only if they are selfexecuting or if Congress has enacted legislation to carry them into effect.168
To determine whether Avena was automatically binding domestic law, the
Court analyzed the treaties underlying the ICJ judgment.169
The Court held that treaty interpretation must begin with the text of the
treaty, followed by due consideration of the treaty’s negotiations and drafting history.170 The majority used this interpretive approach in determining
whether, in the absence of implementing legislation, the treaties underlying
the ICJ judgments in Avena created binding federal law that preempted state
procedural default rules.171 The Court noted that as a signatory to the Optional Protocol, the United States agreed to submit itself to the compulsory
jurisdiction of the ICJ with respect to disputes arising out of the application
and interpretation of the Vienna Convention.172 In doing so, however, the
majority pointed out that the United States did not necessarily agree to be
bound by ICJ decisions.173 Finding that nothing in the language of the Optional Protocol required parties to comply with ICJ judgments or provided
163. Id. at 1356.
164. Id.; see also U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2.
165. Id.
166. Id. (citing Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 314 (1829)).
167. Id. (citing Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888)).
168. Id. (citing Igartua-De La Rosa v. United States, 417 F.3d 145, 150 (1st Cir. 2005)).
169. Id. at 1357.
170. Id. (citing Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217, 226 (1996); Air France v.
Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 396-97 (1985)).
171. Id. at 1357-67.
172. Id. at 1358.
173. Id. The Court stated that a party’s decision to submit to compulsory non-binding
arbitration, for example, did not automatically require the party to treat the arbitral tribunal’s decision as binding. See, e.g., North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 2018(1),
Dec. 17, 1992 32 I.L.M. 697 (1993) (stating that parties’ agreement on a resolution should normally conform with the tribunal’s determination).
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for enforcement mechanisms of such judgments, the Court concluded the
Optional Protocol was simply a grant of jurisdiction and nothing more.174
The Court then considered the text of Article 94 of the U.N. Charter
and the obligation it imposed on signatory nations to comply with judgments of the ICJ.175 The Court acknowledged that under the U.N. Charter,
the United States undertook to comply with those decisions of the ICJ, to
which the United States was a party.176 However, the Court interpreted that
the language “undertakes to comply” to constitute a commitment on the part
of the United States to take future action through the political branches to
ensure compliance with ICJ decisions.177
Moreover, the enforcement provision of Article 94 provided that the
remedy for non-compliance with ICJ judgments was a referral to the Security Council by the aggrieved party—a remedy that was clearly diplomatic
and not judicial in nature.178 The Court reasoned the remedy provided in
Article 94 was a clear indication the U.N. Charter did not contemplate automatic enforceability of ICJ judgments in domestic courts; otherwise, neither Mexico nor the ICJ would need to proceed to the Security Council to
enforce the judgment in Avena.179 Thus, the Court concluded that the enforcement mechanism set out in the U.N. Charter fatally undermined Medellín’s position that the U.N Charter rendered ICJ decisions automatically
enforceable in domestic courts.180 To hold otherwise, the Court stated,
would be to eliminate the option of non-compliance contemplated by Article 94 of the U.N. Charter.181
Lastly, the Court examined the text of the ICJ Statute and incorporated
the U.N. Charter, which allowed the ICJ to hear disputes among memberstates.182 The Court noted that while proceedings before the ICJ are often
the result of disputes among persons or entities, the ICJ Statute clearly
stated that only member-states, and not individuals, could be parties before

174. Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1358.
175. Id. (citing U.N. Charter, supra note 43, art. 94, at 1051).
176. Id. (citing U.N. Charter, supra note 43, art. 94(1), at 1051).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 1359. The Court further noted that the remedy provided in Article 94(2) was not
absolute because it required the Security Council to first deem necessary the issuance of a recommendation, which then could still be vetoed by the United States as a member of the Security
Council. Id. The Court explained that both the Executive branch and the Senate were aware of
this procedure when the President agreed to submit the United States to the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ. Id.
179. Id. at 1359-60 (citing Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 347 (2006)).
180. Id. at 1360.
181. Id.
182. Id. (citing U.N. Charter, supra note 43, art. 34(1), at 1059).
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is the ICJ.183 Article 59 of the ICJ Statute further provided that ICJ
judgments had binding force only as to those member-states that were
parties to a particular case.184 Given the language of the ICJ Statute, the
Court found that Medellín, as an individual, could not be a party to an ICJ
proceeding.185
Taking into consideration the relevant treaties underlying the ICJ
judgment in Avena and finding no textual support to the contrary, the Court
concluded that the relevant treaties were non-self-executing and, in the absence of implementing legislation, did not afford binding domestic legal effect to judgments of the ICJ.186 The Court held that while Avena created an
international obligation on the part of the United States, the ICJ judgment
did not, by itself, constitute binding federal law that would preempt state
procedural default rules.187 Neither the text nor the negotiating and drafting
history of the treaties supported a finding that the President or Senate intended for ICJ judgments to be automatically enforceable in domestic
courts without the aid of implementing legislation.188 Having found Avena
did not automatically bind state courts in the United States, the majority
next considered whether the President had the authority to establish binding
rules of decision that preempt contrary state laws.189
2.

The ICJ Judgment is Not Binding by Virtue of the
President’s Memorandum

The President’s Memorandum stated that the United States would discharge its international obligations under Avena by having state courts provide the required review and reconsideration to the fifty-one Mexican nationals named in Avena.190 The government argued that the President’s ac-

183. Id. (citing U.N. Charter, supra note 43, art. 34, at 1059).
184. Id. (citing U.N. Charter, supra note 43, art. 59, at 1062).
185. Id.
186. Id. at 1364. The Court found it unnecessary to resolve the question of whether the
Vienna Convention itself was self-executing or whether it conferred individually enforceable
rights. Id. at 1357 n.4. Thus, the Court assumed, without deciding, Article 36 of the Vienna Convention granted foreign nationals the right to be informed by the authorities of the detaining state
of their Convention-given individual right to consular notification. Id. (citing Sanchez-Llamas v.
Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 342-43 (2006)).
187. Id. at 1367. The Court noted that while the judgments of an international tribunal might
not have automatic domestic legal effect, such a holding did not render the underlying treaty useless. Id. at 1365. The judgment would still constitute international obligations on the part of the
United States, but such obligations would be best suited for political and diplomatic negotiations.
Id. (citing Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884)). The majority held that Congress was
free to give the treaties domestic effect and could do so through implementing legislation. Id.
188. Id. (citing Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 360).
189. Id. at 1367.
190. Id. at 1355.
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tions in issuing the Memorandum stemmed from both his constitutional
power to settle international disputes and his power to implement treaty obligations on the part of the United States.191 Therefore, the government
contended, the President’s actions were consistent with the first category of
Justice Jackson’s famous tripartite scheme in Youngstown, where the President’s power was at its maximum.192 The Court rejected the government’s
contention, holding that while the President might have authority to enforce
international obligations on the part of the United States, the President
lacked the authority to unilaterally convert a non-self-executing treaty into
one that was self-executing.193 Congress, not the President, possessed such
authority.194 The Court stated that a non-self-executing treaty could become domestically binding only upon a congressional act, because the Constitution vested Congress with the power to make the necessary laws and
the President with the power to execute the laws.195 The Court concluded
that in the absence of implementing legislation, the non-self-executing treaties underlying Avena did not vest the President, expressly or impliedly,
with the power to make Avena binding on state courts in the United
States.196 The President’s Memorandum did not, therefore, fall in the first
category of Justice Jackson’s tripartite framework established in
Youngstown.197
The Court further held that because the Senate ratified the treaties as
non-self-executing, the President was clearly prohibited from creating domestic law making the treaties binding on state courts in the United
States.198 The Court concluded the President’s assertion of authority in
relation to the relevant non-self-executing treaties must therefore fall in the
third category of the Youngstown framework, where the President’s power
was at the lowest end of the spectrum.199 Thus, the government’s argument
that the President’s Memorandum was a valid exercise of power in the
context of Congress’ acquiescence had to necessarily fail, because congressional acquiescence applied only when the President’s act fell in the second,

191. Id. at 1368.
192. Id. at 1368 (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring)).
193. Id. at 1368 (citing Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888), Foster v. Neilson,
27 U.S. 253, 315 (1829), and Igartua-De La Rosa v. United States, 417 F.3d 145, 150 (1st Cir.
2005) (en banc)).
194. Id. (citing Whitney, 124 U.S. at 194).
195. Id. at 1369 (citing Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 591 (2006)).
196. Id.
197. Id. (citing Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring)).
198. Id.
199. Id. (citing Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637-38 (Jackson, J., concurring)).
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and not the third category, of Justice Jackson’s Youngstown framework.200
Given that the President’s Memorandum implementing Avena was not an
act in the absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority, the
Memorandum could not be given effect as domestic law.201
The government next argued that the President’s authority to implement Avena stemmed from his statutory responsibilities and his role in litigating foreign policy concerns.202 The Court rejected this argument stating
that while Congress authorized the President to represent the United States
before the United Nations, the ICJ, and the Security Council, such authority
was pertinent only to the President’s international responsibilities and did
not accord him the power to unilaterally create domestic law.203 Thus, the
congressional authority given to the President was confined to the international realm and did not apply to the issue presented in this case.204 While
the President could comply with the treaty’s obligations through different
means, given they were consistent with the Constitution, he or she could not
rely upon a non-self-executing treaty to establish binding rules of decision
that preempt contrary state law.205
Lastly, the Court noted that the President’s authority to make executive
agreements settling civil claims between American citizens and foreign
governments or nationals had been upheld by the Court in the past.206 According to the majority, the President’s Memorandum in Medellín
represented an unprecedented action by the Executive and was not supported by a longstanding tradition of congressional acquiescence.207 The
Court stated that neither the United States government nor Medellín could
identify other instances in which a presidential directive had been issued to
state courts.208 Moreover, by compelling state courts to set aside applicable
procedural default rules, the President’s Memorandum interfered with the
states’ police power.209 Thus, the Court concluded that the limited authority

200. Id. at 1370. The government’s argument that the President’s asserted authority was
based on congressional acquiescence was based on Congress’ failure to act in prior presidential
resolutions of ICJ controversies. Id. The Court rejected the government’s arguments stating that
none of the prior controversies involved the transformation of an international obligation into domestic law. Id. Given the lack of resemblance between the President’s Memorandum in this case
and the prior resolutions of ICJ controversies, the government’s claim was not supported. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 1371.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. (citing Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 679-80 (1981)).
207. Id. at 1372.
208. Id.
209. Id.
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of the President to settle disputes with foreign governments or nationals
pursuant to an executive agreement could not be extended to the President’s
Memorandum regarding the ICJ’s Avena judgment.210
B. JUSTICE STEVENS’S CONCURRENCE
Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment, stating that Avena was not
binding on courts in the United States and that the relevant treaties did not
authorize the President to direct state courts to implement the judgment,
contrary to state procedural default rules.211 In support of the majority’s
non-self-execution argument, Justice Stevens added that unlike other treaties, the language of the U.N. Charter did not necessarily incorporate international judgments into domestic law.212 He further noted that while Congress had passed implementing legislation ensuring the enforcement of
certain other international judgments, none existed in the case of Avena.213
However, the majority’s opinion failed to persuade Justice Stevens that the
language of Article 94(1) completely foreclosed the possibility the treaty
was self-executing.214 According to Justice Stevens, the obligation on the
part of the United States to undertake to comply with ICJ judgments was
more consistent with self-execution than the majority allowed.215
In conclusion, Justice Stevens stated that while Avena was not the “Supreme Law of the Land,” the judgment nevertheless constituted an international obligation on the part of the United States.216 Justice Stevens pointed
out that the United States was not absolved from its promise to take future
action necessary to comply with the ICJ judgment.217 The concurrence asserted that the State of Texas needed to act to protect the honor and integrity
of the nation, because by failing to comply with the Vienna Convention,
Texas involved the United States in the current dispute in the first place.218
210. Id.
211. Id. at 1372-73 (Stevens, J., concurring).
212. Id. at 1373; see also United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea Annex VI, art.
39, Dec. 10, 1982, S. Treaty Doc. No. 103039, 1833 U.N.T.S. 570 (“[D]ecisions of the [Seabed
Disputes] chamber shall be enforceable in the territories of the States Parties in the same manner
as judgments or orders of the highest court of the State Party in whose territory the enforcement is
sought.”).
213. Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1373; see also Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention), art. 54(1), Mar. 18, 1965,
[1966] 17 U.S.T. 1291 (“Each Contracting State shall recognize an award rendered pursuant to
this Convention as binding and enforce [it] . . . within its territories as if it were a final judgment
of a court in that State.”).
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 1374.
217. Id.
218. Id.
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Justice Stevens stated that the cost to Texas for complying with the Avena
judgment would be minimal.219 On the contrary, the consequences of refusing to comply with the judgment would be significant and would jeopardize
the rights of American citizens abroad, as well as the United States’ commitment to the authority of international law.220 Given the minimal cost of
compliance with Avena, Justice Stevens urged the State of Texas to recognize that the issue presented by Medellín was bigger than whether, in the
absence of implementing legislation, the ICJ and the President could trump
Texas’ procedural rules.221 Thus, concurring with the majority, Justice Stevens noted the Court’s opinion did not foreclose further appropriate action
by the State of Texas.222
C. JUSTICE BREYER’S DISSENT, JOINED BY JUSTICE SOUTER AND
JUSTICE GINSBURG
The dissent focused on the Supremacy Clause, which provides that “all
Treaties . . . which shall be made . . . under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State
shall be bound thereby.”223 The dissent asserted that whenever a treaty
operates of itself, that is, without the aid of any legislative provision, the
treaty must be viewed as equivalent to an act of the legislature.224 In the
Avena case, the United States voluntarily submitted itself to the compulsory
jurisdiction of the ICJ for the purpose of compulsory judgments.225 In addition, because the President determined that domestic courts should comply
with the ICJ judgment in Avena, and because Congress did nothing to sug-

219. Id. at 1375. Justice Stevens stated that Avena merely asked the United States “to provide, by means of its own choosing, review and reconsideration of the convictions and sentences
of the [affected] Mexican nationals.” Id. at 1374. The ICJ asked the United States to consider
whether the violations of the Vienna Convention caused actual prejudice to the Mexican nationals.
Id. Finding the likelihood of such prejudice very remote, Justice Stevens concluded the cost to
Texas for complying with Avena would be minimal. Id. at 1375. In further support of his argument, Justice Stevens referred to Oklahoma’s response to Avena. Id. The Governor of Oklahoma
commuted the death sentence of another Mexican national named in Avena to life without the possibility of parole. Id. at n.4. The Governor based his decision on the following factors: (1) the
United States was a signatory to the Vienna Convention; (2) the treaty provided protection for the
rights of American citizens abroad; (3) the ICJ decision found that the rights of the Mexican nationals have been violated; and (4) the Governor was responding to the United States Department
of State’s plea to carefully consider the Nation’s treaty obligations. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2).
224. Id. (citing Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 314 (1829)).
225. Id. at 1376.
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gest otherwise, Avena was binding on state courts in the same manner as an
act of the legislature.226
1.

The ICJ Judgment is Enforceable as a Matter of Domestic
Law Without Further Legislation

In answering the question of whether the ICJ judgment was automatically binding on state courts, the dissent relied on the Court’s treaty-related
cases interpreting the Supremacy Clause and focused in large part on the
Framers’ intent in drafting the Clause.227 The dissent stated the Supremacy
Clause was designed to allow binding international treaties to have domestic legal effect without the need for implementing legislation.228 The cases,
following the ratification of the Constitution, provided further insight into
the Framers’ intent by holding that a treaty was the law of the land unless it
specifically contemplated further legislative action and thus addressed itself
to the political and not the judicial department.229
The dissent noted that while there was no “magic answer” as to what
provisions were self-executing, the Court’s precedents clearly indicated that
the majority’s approach of requiring self-execution language in the treaty’s
text was misplaced.230 The provisions found by the Court to be selfexecuting in the past lacked the textual clarity required by the majority.231
The dissent reasoned the lack of clarity in treaty language was most likely
the result of the drafters’ awareness of national differences in determining
the necessary requirements for a treaty to become domestic law.232
Therefore, the dissent concluded the absence or presence of textual clarity

226. Id. (citing Foster, 27 U.S. 253, 314 (1829)).
227. Id. at 1377.
228. Id. The dissent relied primarily on the views expressed by Justice Iredell, a member of
the North Carolina Ratifying Convention, which were later used by Justice Story to explain the
Framer’s intent behind the Supremacy Clause. Id. at 1378 (citing JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES
ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, 696-97 (1833)).
229. Id. at 1379 (quoting Foster, 27 U.S. at 314). In Foster, the Court found a treaty to be
non-self-executing because of the specific language of the treaty, “shall be ratified.” Id. (citing
Foster, 27 U.S. at 315). Such language, the Court held, demonstrated that the provision contemplated further legislative action. Id. (citing Foster, 27 U.S. at 315). However, the Court changed
its holding four years later due to the less legislative Spanish-language version of the treaty at
issue. Id.
230. Id. at 1380.
231. Id. at 1380-81.
232. Id. at 1381. To clarify these national differences, the dissent used Britain’s approach to
treaty implementation, which almost always required parliamentary legislation before a treaty
could be domestically enforced. Id. On the contrary, the practice in the Netherlands was to directly incorporate treaties concluded by the Executive without explicit parliamentary approval of
the treaty. Id.
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in a treaty’s language as to self-execution was irrelevant to the question of
whether a treaty was in fact self-executing.233
The dissent further stated that examining the text and history of a
treaty, together with its subject matter and related characteristics, is the correct approach to determine whether the treaty provision addresses itself to
the political branches, contemplating further action, or to the judicial
branch, contemplating direct enforcement.234 Applying the practical, context-specific approach mentioned above, the dissent determined the relevant
treaty provisions in Medellín to be self-executing as applied to the ICJ
judgment in Avena.235 The dissent noted that the language of the relevant
treaties supported a finding of direct judicial enforceability.236 In addition,
the Optional Protocol applied to disputes arising out of the Vienna Convention, which was itself self-executing and judicially enforceable.237 The dissent further stated that the treaty provision providing for binding and final
judgments for treaty-based settlement disputes was logically self-executing,
because the judgment’s underlying treaty provision was itself selfexecuting.238 Finally, according to the dissent, the majority’s approach had
serious negative practical implications for the United States, which submitted itself to the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ in more than seventy
treaties.239 Thus, if in Medellín the Optional Protocol, the U.N. Charter, and
the ICJ Statute, were insufficient to warrant enforcement of the ICJ judgment, it would be difficult to see how a different result could be reached as
to those other treaties.240
Moreover, the dissent stated that the majority could not look to Congress for a “quick fix.”241 The dissent noted that Congress was unlikely to
authorize the automatic enforcement of all ICJ judgments, given the possibility that some of these judgments might contain sensitive political issues

233. Id.
234. Id. at 1382 (citing Foster, 27 U.S. at 314).
235. Id. at 1382-83.
236. Id. at 1382. The dissent noted that the language of Article 94(1) of the U.N. Charter
providing that each member “undertakes to comply with the decision” of the ICJ, together with
the ICJ Statute’s provision stating that such a decision had binding force between parties who
have submitted themselves to the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ, clearly indicated the necessity for judicial activity. Id.
237. Id. at 1385. The dissent stated that because the provision involved an individual’s right
to be informed of his or her separate right to contact his or her nation’s consul and because such a
right was intertwined with the rules of criminal procedure, the provision contained judicially enforceable standards. Id.
238. Id. at 1386.
239. Id. at 1387.
240. Id. at 1387-88.
241. Id. at 1388.
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better suited for the other branches.242 Avena called for the review and
reconsideration of the possible prejudice caused to the fifty-one Mexican
nationals as a result of the Vienna Convention violation.243 Such a call required an understanding of criminal law and procedure.244 Therefore, it was
the judiciary, not the legislature, that was best-suited for the task.245 The
dissent emphasized that a finding that the United States’ treaty obligation
was self-executing and Avena enforceable would not create a constitutional
conflict with the other branches.246 The fact that neither the President nor
Congress have expressed any concern about the direct judicial enforcement
of the ICJ judgment in Avena supported such a statement.247 The dissent
concluded that the ICJ judgment in Avena was judicially enforceable in
domestic courts without the need for implementing legislative action.248
Finding the Avena judgment binding, the dissent next turned to the
question of what would constitute a proper review and reconsideration of
the state convictions and sentences of the fifty-one Mexican nationals.249
The dissent stated that the proper course of action for the Supreme Court in
Medellín would be to remand the case, making Texas’ state courts the
proper forum for review and reconsideration.250 The dissent further noted
that state review was proper because both the crime and the prosecution at
issue took place in Texas.251 Therefore, the ICJ judgment in Avena required
Texas to consider whether the failure to inform Medellín of his Vienna
Convention rights caused Medellín actual prejudice, notwithstanding state
procedural default rules barring such consideration.252 Finally, because
Texas law authorizes a criminal defendant to seek post-judgment review
where the law provides a legal basis that was previously unavailable, the
dissent stated the case should have been remanded for reconsideration to the
Texas state courts, directing them to apply Avena as binding law.253 Having
reached the conclusion Avena constituted binding domestic law, the dissent
did not focus on whether the President had the constitutional authority to
242. Id. The dissent noted military hostility, naval activity, and the handling of nuclear weapons as likely politically sensitive judgments. Id.
243. Id. (citing Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. V. U.S.), 2004
I.C.J. 12, 65 (Mar. 31)).
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 1389.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 1390.
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enforce Avena.254 In the last part of its opinion, however, the dissent addressed the majority’s holding that the President may not rely upon a nonself-executing treaty to establish binding rules of decision that preempt
contrary state law.255
2.

The President’s Memorandum

The dissent noted that the President’s Memorandum was an attempt on
the part of the Executive to implement treaty provisions, in which the
United States agreed the ICJ judgment was binding with respect to
Avena.256 According to the dissent, the President acted pursuant to his constitutional authority in the area of foreign affairs in issuing the memorandum.257 Therefore, his acts fell within the second category of Justice Jackson’s Youngstown framework, in which the President acts where Congress
has neither explicitly authorized nor prohibited the act in question. 258
The dissent noted that if the President had the constitutional authority
in the area of foreign affairs to act with respect to Avena, then the issuance
of the Memorandum would require setting aside state procedural law.259
The dissent stated that past Court decisions have upheld the President’s authority to make and implement executive agreements with respect to international obligations and to assert principles of foreign sovereign immunity,
even where such authority could require state law to be set aside.260 However, the dissent did not reach a conclusion on the constitutional balance
among state and federal or executive and legislative power in the area of
foreign affairs.261 The dissent noted it lacked the judicial expertise in determining the scope of presidential authority to implement treaty provisions
contrary to state law.262 Such determination, the dissent stated, was best left
in “the constitutional shade from which it has emerged.”263

254. Id.
255. See discussion infra Part III.A.2 (stating that in the absence of implementing legislation,
a non-self-executing treaty does not give the President the authority to create binding rules of decision that preempt contrary state law).
256. Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1390.
257. Id.
258. Id. (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
259. Id.
260. Id. at 1390-91 (citing Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 588 (1943) and United States v.
Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233 (1942)).
261. Id. at 1391.
262. Id.
263. Id.

2009]

CASE COMMENT

463

IV. IMPACT
The Supreme Court’s decision in Medellín v. Texas drew a great deal
of domestic and international attention.264 Supporters of the decision commended the ruling,265 while opponents urged Congress to act immediately
and implement the Avena judgment.266 The United States Supreme Court,
however, reaffirmed the holding of Medellín only a few months after the
initial opinion by denying Medellín’s petition for writ of certiorari and motion for stay of execution.267 At the same time, Congress reacted to Medellín by attempting to provide the requisite legislative approval for implementing Avena.268 Throughout these judicial and legislative developments,
legal scholars continued to debate the impact of Medellín, the effect of the
decision on the interpretation and implementation of international treaty
obligations, and the questions the Supreme Court left unanswered in Medellín v. Texas.269
A. SUBSEQUENT HISTORY
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Medellín v. Texas, Medellín
filed a subsequent application for writ of habeas corpus and a motion for

264. See Robert Greffenius, Selling Medellín: The Entourage of Litigation Surrounding The
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and the Weight of International Court of Justice Opinions in the Domestic Sphere, 23 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 943, 946 (2008) (arguing the Supreme
Court in Medellín failed to establish a test for analyzing binding decisions of international tribunals such as the ICJ); but see Noah Feldman, When Judges Make Foreign Policy, N.Y. TIMES
MAGAZINE, Sept. 28, 2008, at 50 (stating the case generated little public attention, although in its
own way it was instrumental in defining the United States’ constitutional era). As of November
2009, only two opinions had cited to the Supreme Court decision in Medellín v. Texas. See e.g., In
re Martinez, 209 P.3d 908 (Cal. 2009). Legal scholars, however, continued to write about the
significance of the case and the future of treaty obligations following the Medellín decision. See,
e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Constitutional Power to Interpret International Law, 118 YALE
L.J. 1762 (2009).
265. James C. McKinley Jr., Texas Executes Mexican Despite Objections, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
6, 2008, available at http://www nytimes.com (search title, then click title hyperlink).
266. See Frederic L. Kirgis, International Law in the American Courts—the United States
Supreme Court Declines to Enforce the I.C.J.’s Avena Judgment Relating to a U.S. Obligation
Under the Convention on Consular Relations, 9 GERMAN L.J. 619, 634-35 (2008) (explaining the
possible steps Mexico might take in response to the United States’ refusal to provide review and
reconsideration for Medellín’s conviction and sentence); see also The StandDown Texas Project,
Today’s Medellín Coverage, http://www.standdown.typepad.com/weblog/2008/08/todays-medel
lin html (last visited on Nov. 21, 2009) (statement of Sandra Babcock, counsel for Medellín)
(stating that if Texas proceeds with the execution, the United States will find itself in breach of its
international obligations).
267. See discussion infra Part IV.A (analyzing the Supreme Court’s denial of Medellín’s
petition for writ of certiorari and motion for stay of execution).
268. See discussion infra Part IV.B (discussing Congress’ proposed legislation regarding the
ICJ judgment in Avena).
269. See discussion infra Parts IV.C, IV.D (examining the effect of Medellín on United
States-Mexico relations and addressing some of the questions raised by the decision).
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stay of execution.270 After the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed
the application, Medellín filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the
United States Supreme Court.271 In denying Medellín’s motion for stay of
execution, the Supreme Court held that the possibility of either Congress or
the state legislature determining Medellín’s sentence should be vacated because of Avena was too remote to warrant stay of execution.272 The Court
reiterated its position that when treaties are non-self-executing, treaty obligations undertaken by the United States can become binding domestic law
only through implementing legislation.273
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens stated that the stay of execution should have been granted because the harm of refusing to respect the
ICJ judgment outweighed a short delay in imposing the sentence.274 Justice
Souter, in a separate dissent, noted that he would grant the petition to allow
for the views of the Solicitor General to be considered and for any congressional action that might affect the disposition of the case to be taken.275 In
his dissenting opinion, Justice Breyer determined that the issue before the
Court was whether the United States would carry out its international legal
obligations to enforce the ICJ judgment in Avena.276 Granting the stay of
execution, Justice Breyer asserted, would prevent the Court from placing
the nation in violation of international law.277 However, on August 6, 2008,
shortly after the Supreme Court denied Medellín’s motion, Medellín was
executed by lethal injection.278 The Governor of Texas, Mr. Rick Perry, rejected requests from Mexico, the State Department, and the White House to
delay the execution, stating that the nature of Medellín’s crimes were just
cause for the death penalty.279
B. LEGISLATIVE CHANGES
On July 14, 2008, members of the United States House of Representatives introduced the “Avena Case Implementation Act of 2008,” seeking to
provide the legislative approval necessary to implement the ICJ judgment in

270. Medellín v. Texas, 129 S. Ct. 360, 361 (2008) (per curium).
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 362 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
275. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg filed a separate dissent inviting, similarly
to Justice Souter, the views of the Solicitor General on the current matter. Id. at 363 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
276. Id. at 363 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
277. Id. at 364.
278. McKinley, supra note 265, at 1.
279. Id.
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Avena.280 The introduction of the bill was partly the result of requests made
by United States Attorney General Michael Mukasey, Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice, and past and present presidents of the American Society
of International Law.281 All urged Congress to take legislative action and
resolve the treaty dispute between Mexico and the United States over the
convictions and sentences of the Mexican nationals named in Avena, including Medellín.282 The legislation, as proposed, would empower federal
courts to hear the Vienna Convention claims of foreign nationals who were
not advised of their right to consular notification.283 Furthermore, the
United States’ government informed the International Court of Justice that
it would take further steps to give effect to the convictions and sentences of
the Mexican nationals named in the Avena judgment.284 The legislation
was referred to the House Judiciary Committee for consideration, but no
further developments have been reported.285 Thus, in the absence of clear
congressional response to Avena, some international commentators suggested other possible ways in which Mexico could seek remedies.286
C. IMPLICATIONS FOR UNITED STATES-MEXICO RELATIONS
Mexico has two primary options for remedies.287 First, Mexico could
invoke Article 60(2)(b) of the Vienna Convention.288 Article 60(2)(b) provides that as a party affected by a material breach of a multilateral treaty,
Mexico could suspend the operation of the treaty, in whole or in part, in its
280. Medellín, 129 S. Ct. at 361 (Breyer, J., dissenting). See also Diane Jennings, Federal
Officials Try to Block Texas Execution to Allow World Court Review of Case, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, July 28, 2008, available at http://www.dallasnews.com/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2009) (stating that Representatives Howard Bernan and Zoe Lofgren of California introduced a bill in Congress to require the state to comply with the Avena judgment of the ICJ).
281. See The StandDown Texas Project, supra note 266 (discussing the proposed legislation
regarding Avena); see also Marcia Coyle, Attorneys Urge Congressional Leaders to Address Issue
of Mexican Nationals on Death Row, NAT’L L.J., July 24, 2008, available at http://www.law.
com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202423200889&slreturn=1&hbxlogin=1 (discussing the importance of congressional action and the importance of such action for ensuring the protection of
American citizens abroad).
282. See Coyle, supra note 281 (stating that attorneys are asking Congress to take action
regarding Medellín’s sentence).
283. See The StandDown Texas Project, Medellín & Congressional Legislation, http://stand
down.typepad.com/weblog/federal_legislation/ (July 30, 2008) (discussing the language of the
Avena Case Implementation Act of 2008).
284. Medellín, 129 S. Ct. at 362 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Request for Interpretation of
the Judgment of 31 March 2004 in the Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals
(Mex. v. U.S.), 2008 I.C.J. ¶ 37 (Order of July 16)).
285. Id. at 361.
286. Kirgis, supra note 266, at 633.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 633 (citing Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 60(2)(b), May 23,
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331).
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relations to the United States.289 Mexico most likely would be unsuccessful
in pursuing this course of action, however, because Mexico would be unable to show that the Supreme Court’s decision in Medellín rose to the level
of material breach required by the Vienna Convention.290 Second, customary international law provides that a State injured by an intentionally
wrongful act of another State, such as breach of treaty obligations, may take
proportional countermeasures against that State.291 Thus, Mexico might
choose to disregard Article 36(1)(b) of the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations when United States nationals are arrested and detained by Mexican authorities.292 Moreover, customary international law permits States,
other than the injured State, to take countermeasures in response to violations of international treaties.293 Non-injured States may take countermeasures where the violation amounts to a breach of duty owed to a group
of States or the international community as a whole.294 Thus, similarly to
Mexico, other States may choose to deny the right to consular notification
to United States nationals arrested and detained on their territories.295 The
effect of Medellín on the relationship between the United States and Mexico
remains unclear and represents only one of many questions the United
States Supreme Court failed to address in Medellín.296
D. THE UNANSWERED QUESTIONS
Medellín v. Texas left commentators wondering about the future of international treaty obligations.297 The decision has raised new doubts about
whether other United States treaty obligations are binding as domestic
law.298 Some commentators have suggested that one possible way of
289. Id.
290. Id. at 634. The International Law Commission’s comments to the Vienna Convention
state that when the non-violating party (here, Mexico) considers the violated treaty provision essential to the execution of the treaty, the violation constitutes a material breach. Id. at 633. Kirgis
argues that because neither Mexico nor the United States considered the binding nature of the ICJ
judgments to be essential to the execution of the Vienna Convention, Mexico would not be able to
show the United States committed a material breach. Id. at 634.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 635; see also Allen Turner, Medellín Executed for Rape, Murder of Houston
Teens, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Aug. 6, 2008, available at http://www.blogrunner.com/snapshot/
D/0/3/medellin_executed_for_rape_murder_of_houston_teens/ (last visited Nov. 21, 2009) (stating the Supreme Court’s decision in Medellín could affect American citizens living abroad with
regard to their Vienna Convention rights).
293. Krigis, supra note 266, at 634-35.
294. Id. at 636.
295. Id.
296. See discussion infra Part IV.D.
297. E.g., Greffenius, supra note 264, at 944.
298. See Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties’ End: The Past, Present, and Future of International
Lawmaking in the United States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236, 1321 (2008) (stating that while the impact of

2009]

CASE COMMENT

467

eliminating the doubt created by Medellín would be to enact international
agreements as congressional-executive agreements.299 Others argue that the
Constitution presumes treaties to be self-executing and suggest that a default rule of self-execution be established.300 Such a rule, commentators
assert, will be consistent with both the text of the Constitution and the
structure and precedent of the Supreme Court.301 Furthermore, a default
rule of self-execution will enable treaty-makers to control the domestic consequences of treaties.302
In addition, the question of how United States courts should consider
ICJ judgments in the future, when these judgments are rendered in accordance with self-executing or congressionally implemented treaties, remains
undecided.303 The standard for determining whether a treaty is self-executing or whether congressional action is necessary for its implementation is
unclear as well.304 Finally, the Supreme Court failed to address the subject
of federalism within the context of international treaty obligations and left
unanswered the question of whether the federal government may mandate
states to comply with the government’s international obligations.305 Thus,
while legal scholars responded quickly to some of the issues raised by
Medellín in the months following the decision, commentators are likely to
continue the debate on the significance of Medellín v. Texas and its future
effect on the interpretation and implementation of the United States’ treaty
obligations.306

Medellín remains unclear, the decision has raised questions about international treaty obligations
for the United States).
299. Id.; see also Milena Sterio, The Evolution of International Law, 31 B.C. INT’L & COMP.
L. REV. 213, 250 n.217 (2008) (stating that following Medellín, “congressional action must be
taken in order to ratify international law and implement it domestically”).
300. See Vázquez, supra note 32, at 602 (suggesting that treaties should be construed to be
self-executing under the Constitution).
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. See Greffenius, supra note 264, at 946-47 (proposing the implementation of an international Erie doctrine as a way of reconciling the United States Supreme Court decision in SanchezLlamas v. Oregon with the ICJ judgment in Avena).
304. See John F. Murphy, Medellín v. Texas: Implications of the Supreme Court’s Decision
for the United States and the Rule of Law in International Affairs, 31 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L.
REV. 247, 248 (2008) (arguing that the lack of certainty in determining whether international treaties are domestically binding undermines the United States’ respect for the rule of law in international treaty obligations).
305. See Craig Jackson, The Anti-Commandeering Doctrine and Foreign Policy Federalism—the Missing Issue in Medellín v. Texas, 31 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 335, 335-36
(2008) (addressing the possible federalism implications of Medellín v. Texas).
306. See generally Greffenius, supra note 264, at 944 (discussing the response to Medellín
by legal commentators).
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V. CONCLUSION
In Medellín v. Texas, the Supreme Court ruled on the judgment of the
ICJ in Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals and the President’s Memorandum attempting to implement that decision as domestic
law.307 The Court found that while Avena created an international obligation on the part of the United States, the treaties underlying the judgment
were non-self-executing and, in the absence of implementing legislation,
did not constitute binding federal law that preempted state procedural default rules.308 The Court further held that because the Executive did not
have the authority to unilaterally execute an international judgment, the
President’s Memorandum did not make the ICJ Avena judgment binding on
state courts.309
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